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1. Introduction
The overall goal of this paper is to evaluate theories that attempt to address the
organizing principles of language and review the development of these theories
toward the integration of language within an interactive network of higher-level
cognitive functions. Commencing with an overview of traditional concepts of lan-
guage as modular, distinct, and innate, we focus firstly on areas that highlight the
foundation of modularity theory including various module definitions and crite-
ria, and applications of modularity in information processing and biological sys-
tems. We also discuss challenges to the overall applicability of a modular system
and limitations of modular models in dealing with adaptation, novelty, innate ver-
sus learned, domain-general and domain-specific features, and developmental and
age-related changes of cognitive organization.
Prompted by the rapidly increasing amount of empirical data on the func-
tional elements of the human brain, we then evaluate several major theories of cog-
nition, including views that oppose modular organization and those that integrate
modular and semi-modular views with topological modularity in simpler, and dy-
namic integration in higher-level cognitive functions.Within this framework, mod-
ular and non-modular components of linguistic knowledge, organizing principles
of language viewed either as specific or derived from other systems, and concepts
of language as one of the cognitive functions or the outcome of unique interactions
among cognitive components are discussed.
Emerging theories that integrate interactive network models support a cog-
nitive architecture as a mosaic of domain-specific and domain-general processes
involving both functional segregation and integration within a global neuronal
workspace. Within this anatomically distributed workspace, the language func-
tion represents unique interactions among cognitive components consistent with
an organization that is task-dependent with a continuum between degrees of mod-
ular and shared processing. As a higher-level, learning-based, and effortful cog-
nitive process language transiently enlists a less modular organization for an effi-
cient network configuration in interaction with several cognitive systems and the
domain-general cognitive control/multiple-demand network.
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2. Traditional Views of Language and Cognitive Architecture: Limitations
and Challenges
Traditional explanatory models considered the language faculty (FL) as an organ
of the body determined by genetic endowment (Universal Grammar, UG), expe-
rience, and possible design features, mainly centered around the concept of com-
putational efficiency and conceptualized as third factor principles in subsequent
theories. Some of these features, based on the initially assumed lack of difference
in basic language capacity among contemporary humans, have also been consid-
ered language (UG) and/or even organism (third factor principles) independent
(Chomsky 2005, 2011). Earlier concepts also held language as different and distinct
from other cognitive functions with considerations of UG as a specific language
module or a modularized knowledge or element of the FL (Hauser et al. 2002).
Modularity, originally an engineering notion of near-decomposability, refers
to a system that is made of components whose workings are independent of each
other and in which the modular structure allows parts to be modified without the
whole system ceasing to function (Simon 1969). The concept of modularity includ-
ing certain characteristic and/or necessary model features (Fodor 1983), and a mod-
ular design was considered central in biology (Marr 1982) with a general modular
theory also proposed for perception and cognition (Coltheart 1999). The modular
organization hypothesis has been also linked historically to the claim that aspects of
the human mind are innately specified (Fodor 1983, reviewed in Twyman & New-
combe 2010).
The integration of modular organization in certain biological areas such as
development has high explanatory value. However, a strictly modular view is con-
troversial in the cognitive sciences as it precludes complex processes such as asso-
ciative learning, attention, working memory, or general intelligence that cut across
domains (Shettleworth 2012). The assumption that much of the cognitive process-
ing is modular was challenged early on by fMRI data of brain activation (Wojciulik
et al. 1998), and studies of neurodevelopmental language disorders that proposed
relative modularity that is only achieved after an extensive period of developmen-
tal time (Bishop 1997, Karmiloff-Smith 2007). The widely different definitions of
what constitutes a module remain controversial and the minimum criteria that are
required for a system to be considered modular are unsettled (Twyman & New-
combe 2010, Kaltenbach & Stelling 2012). Important theoretical challenges also re-
main regarding function-centered decomposition of dynamic biological networks
(Kaltenbach & Stelling 2012). The controversial issues include the integration of
modular clusters in a larger-scale as modalities in the brain need to be both isolated
and sufficiently connected for coherent functions (Gallos et al. 2012), questions as
to how does a modular system deal with novelty (Anselme 2012), the innate and/or
developmental nature of modularity (Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith 2002), the lack of
one-to-one correspondence in function to structure mapping (Petersson et al. 2012),
the relationship between domain-general and domain-specific cognitive processes
(Meunier et al. 2010, Kitzbichler et al. 2011), the continuum between strictly mod-
ular processing and degrees of task dependent shared processing (Borowsky et al.
2007), and functional specialization as a matter of discrete units or as a matter of
degree (Kanwisher 2010).
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2.1. Universal Grammar: A Disputed Language Module
One of the most influential traditional theories of language assumed an innate fac-
ulty with a defining influence of neural circuitry shaped by biological determinants
(Chomsky 1965, 1968, 1995, 2005). A few genetic events (summarized by Chom-
sky 2005), subsequently also interpreted as a single mutation scenario (reviewed in
Jackendoff 2011), had been proposed to rewire the human brain and create an ab-
stract cognitive mechanism responsible for the development of language. Within
this framework a modular organization of cognitive functions was also assumed in
which language constitutes its own module (Hauser et al. 2002). The traditional
linguistics term of language refers to an internal component of the mind and/or
brain (internal or I-language). The the FL in the broad sense (FLB) was proposed to
include a narrower internal computational system (FLN) and at least two other in-
ternal systems (sensorimotor and conceptual-intentional) and cognitive resources
or abilities necessary for the acquisition and use of language that together consti-
tute UG (Hauser et al. 2002). FLN was considered to only include recursion and
to be the uniquely human component of the FL and a biological capacity of hu-
mans that allows mastering of language without explicit instructions (Hauser et al.
2002). FLN by this definition cannot be compared to anything existing in the mind
of other species, not even in other domains of the human mind (revisited in Boeckx
& Longa 2011 and Traxler et al. 2012).
Alternative theories include those that argue that the language-specifically
adapted sensorimotor systems should be part of FLN, traditions that consider the
conceptual-intentional system as intrinsic part of FLN (Jackendoff 2011), and views
that language is built on biological and cognitive foundations that pre-date the
emergence of language (Chater et al. 2009, Christiansen et al. 2009). Although
language is used to express recursive thoughts, their recursive nature is indepen-
dent of language and likely preceded its evolution (Corballis 2011). Recursion may
have evolved in order to solve other computational problems such as navigation,
quantification, or social relationships (Hauser et al. 2002). Furthermore, as recur-
sion is not unique to language, it cannot constitute FLN (Jackendoff 2011).
Theories that held FL as a distinct module among other cognitive modules,
also considered UG as a specific and modularized knowledge/element of the lan-
guage faculty. UG as a genetically determined language acquisition device that
constrains the parametric options available for natural languages has been viewed
as the key component that explains both the linguistic universals and the assumed
quick and uniform path to language acquisition (Hauser et al. 2002). Based on
the shared common core of human languages (Berwick et al. 2013), the poverty
of stimulus for UG argues that invariant properties of the human mind, including
the structure dependence of grammatical rules and certain constraints on question
formation, reflect an innate human endowment (Berwick et al. 2011). The prin-
ciples and neural mechanisms of UG have also been regarded not only as innate,
but distinctly modularized and independent of (though connected to) other parts
of cognition (Grodzinsky 2006).
UG however is a disputed notion (Elman et al. 1996, Boden 2006, Clark &
Lappin 2011). Some argue that the simplest idea is that there is a universal set of
cognitive capacities underlying human linguistic competence. Others question the
reality of UG given that there is no consensus on the very notion of UG, and also
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question the species specificity, poverty of stimulus, ease of acquisition, and unifor-
mity of the knowledge of language across a population (Da¸browska 2004, Evans &
Levinson 2009 reviewed in Irurtzun 2012). During language acquisition there is no
need for UG to figure out what grammar/syntax underlies a particular language,
the ability to learn signs also enables the learning of combinatorial signs or dedi-
cated order of signs (Bouchard 2012). There are factors other than language-specific
UG conditions that can canalize grammar very stringently: Properties of the per-
ceptual and conceptual systems necessarily impose boundaries within a highly cir-
cumscribed course of language development and these properties are considered
sufficient elements of language. Further challenging the existence or need for in-
nately specified knowledge of language, a Bayesian framework for grammar in-
duction showed that given certain innate domain-general capacities, a learner can
recognize the hierarchical phrase structure of language without having this knowl-
edge innately specified (Perfors et al. 2011).
2.2. The Computational View of Language
The basic design of language as a biological subsystem reveals a system of discrete
infinity, that is unbound number of expressions. Language (the unified nature of
language) has been proposed to arise from a shared species-specific computational
ability that is grounded in a neuronally realized computational mechanism that
yields an infinite array of structured expressions. At minimum, this computational
mechanism is able to combine one linguistic representation with others, yielding
new and larger linguistic objects. The computational mechanism includes some
operation (Merge) that constructs new representational elements from already con-
structed elements which must then be transposed to linear representations, a con-
straint imposed on the sensorimotor systems input–output channel (words must
be pronounced sequentially) and on language perception (listeners analyze sequen-
tially ordered acoustic sequences) (Chomsky 1995). In this view, the FL as a compu-
tational device is capable of processing symbolic elements and externalizing and in-
ternalizing the output of such computations. The computational system is viewed
as the outcome of interactions between a sequencer (activity performed by the basal
ganglia) and working memory (the activity of diverse cortical structures) (Benı´tez-
Burraco 2012). Accordingly, language acquisition depends on the interplay of the
shared initial genetic endowment (UG, the language- and human-specific module),
conditions imposed by the structure of the brain, cognitive preconditions (statisti-
cal analytical capacity), external influences (environmental stimulants), and certain
general principles such as external laws of growth and form, and minimalization
of computational complexity (Berwick et al. 2013).
2.3. Modularity in Information Processing
The ubiquity of modularity and hierarchical modularity across technological and
biological systems prompted a search for dynamic, adaptive, or anatomical con-
straints that may drive the evolution of networks towards a modular architecture
(Meunier et at. 2010). A system built of multiple and sparsely interconnected mod-
ules allows efficient adaptation. Evolution of such a modular system can take place
by change in one module at a time or by duplication or mutation of modules with-
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out loss of function of well-adapted modules. The evolution of individual modules
does not jeopardize the function of the entire system and results in robustness, a
major advantage for any system evolving under changing selection criteria. High
clustering of connections favor locally segregated processing of specialized func-
tions (as in visual motion detection), while short path length supports globally inte-
grated processing of generic functions (as in working memory) (Meunier et al. 2010,
Sporns et al. 2010, 2013). Modular topology is associated with rich non-linear dy-
namic behavior including time-scale separation (fast intra-modular and slow inter-
modular processes) and high dynamical complexity due to the coexistence of both
segregated and integrated activity. The feedback between structure and function
including reinforcement of links between synchronized units and pruning of links
between asynchronized ones, naturally drives the emergence of inhomogeneities
and a modular network. Optimality at performing tasks in a changing environ-
ment, where different goals share basic sub-problems and where rapid adaptation
to each of the different goals is enhanced, produces networks, modules, and mod-
ular units that specialize in these sub-problems. Thus a modular network is a topo-
logically modular and nearly decomposable system made of component modules
each of which comprises a number of nodes that are densely intra-connected to
each other but sparsely connected to nodes in other modules (Meunier et al. 2010).
2.4. Modularity in Biological Systems
In biomedical research, mechanistic explanations dominate by which a phe-
nomenon is explained by revealing the set of entities and activities that are spatially,
temporally, and causally organized. The modular partitioning and hierarchical
structure of the biological space emerged as a symmetry-breaking phase transition
exemplified by metabolic networks, gene networks, protein interaction networks,
or social networks (Lorenz et al. 2011). The biological norm has been considered
to be a set of specialized modular systems and this type of organization presumed
so ubiquitous that all functional systems were anticipated to be subject to the same
organizational principles. In evolutionary and developmental biology, modular-
ity, defined in general terms as a property of being made up of self-contained and
independently functioning parts, is regarded as a key principle (reviewed in Shet-
tleworth 2012).
Connotation for modules (Fodor 1983) has been defined as autonomous (op-
erate independently of other systems and are independently disruptable), domain
specific (responsive to a distinctive class of stimuli), innately specified, informa-
tionally encapsulated (impervious to information outside the modules domain, a
feature considered to be at the heart of modularity, Fodor 2001), peripheral (as op-
posed to central decision making), fast acting (as a reflex), mandatory (not under
conscious control), obligatory (acting regardless of circumstances) and hardwired.
While innateness and modularity are different concepts, modules are often held
innate in the sense that they develop similarly across individuals regardless of en-
vironmental input (Barrett 2012).
These definitions have been interpreted not as necessary conditions for the
applicability of the term but rather as a general theory of perception and cogni-
tion and features that are characteristic of modules (Coltheart 1999). While it has
been recognized that the notion of modularity ought to admit to degrees (Fodor
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1983), it has also been postulated that if a system has most of the modularity prop-
erties, then it is very likely to have all of them, a mechanistic explanation derived
from the computational information-processing paradigm. Of the various module-
associated concepts, however, only the concept of autonomy corresponds to strict
modularity in the sense of independent disruptability, or dissociability (it can be
selectively disabled with no effect on other capacities of the same system) (Menzies
2012).
The most basic term of a module is a capacity that is functionally individ-
uated in terms of its input and output conditions with domain-specificity as its
most important property. The generalized and widely applied conceptualization
of a module involves a set of related elements that maintain a strong connectiv-
ity within but a weak connectivity among other equivalent sets of elements. In
this general sense, a module may include sets of functionally interrelated genes,
interactions among regulatory elements, interrelated set of neuronal structures, or
coordinated actions of biological structures (Benı´tez-Burraco 2012).
While the traditional analysis of complex biological networks relied on de-
composition into smaller, semi-autonomous units (e.g. signaling pathways), with
the recently increased scope of systems biology the different definitions of what
constitutes a module or a modular structure and the function centered decomposi-
tion of dynamic biological networks sparked controversies (Kaltenbach & Stelling
2012). There are considerable debates about the extent to which any modular
structure in a mature adult is inborn or emerges through experience (Thomas &
Karmiloff-Smith 2002). Other views point out that biological systems are actually
not all highly specialized and modularized and are rather varied in how they con-
strain processes (Gallistel & Gibbon 2000). Moreover, the modularity assumption
does not apply universally in all domains, there is more depth to mechanistic expla-
nations than box-and-arrow diagrams, and the spatial and temporal organization
of mechanisms are often as significant as the causal organization (Gallistel & Gib-
bon 2000, Menzies 2012).
3. Organizing Principles of Cognition: From Modules to Global Neuronal
Workspace
3.1. Modular Models of Cognitive Functions
Modularity has been traditionally presumed as being essential at both cognitive
and neural levels, yet the notions of neural and cognitive modularity remain con-
troversial (Marcus 2006). Of the brain mechanisms, commonly thought of as
falling into two categories: specialized and general-purpose, the specialized mech-
anisms being frequently associated with the idea of modules (Barrett 2012, Barrett
& Kurzban 2006). In this model, independent disruptability has been assumed to
be a basic meaning of modularity as two sub-processes (mental or neural) can be
modules if and only if each can be changed independently of the other (Sternberg
2010). Thus the notion of modularity, applied in a strict sense to the organization
of the brain, envisions a system made of components whose workings are indepen-
dent of each other with parts modifiable (Simon 1969) exemplified in the modular
account of the visual system viewed as a computational system made of a collection
of small independent sub-processes (Marr 1982).
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The general application of the modularity concept to cognitive functions
(Marr 1982, Coltheart 1999, Anselme 2012) resulted in the assumption of massive
modularity for the human mind while other theories of modularity such as the (i)
core knowledge modules position (Spelke & Kinzler 2007) distinguished limited
number of core knowledge modules (object, action, number, geometry, and social
partner representation), or in a version of core modules, six big traits (intelligence,
openness, contentiousness, agreeableness, emotional stability, and extraversion)
modules presumed to be domain specific, innate, and even shared across species
(reviewed in Twyman & Newcombe 2010). Modules defined by these theories,
however, do not conform to the module definition (Fodor 1983), few are encap-
sulated, and most are involved in various cognitive functions.
Among various additional theories, the (ii) functional modularity approach
argues that the key property of cognitive modularity is functional specificity given
that distinct domains of information require specific processes to operate on them
(Barrett & Kurzban 2006). In this view, functional modules constitute a subsystem
of the cognitive system each dedicated to specialized functions. (iii) Anatomical
modularity is an additional thesis by which each functional module is implemented
in a dedicated, relatively small, circumscribed neural hardware (Anderson 2010).
In this paradigm, various kinds of cognitive modules have been distinguished: de-
velopmental, (neuro)functional, mental, or even virtual (a pattern of dissociability
between aspects of the systems that does not correspond to separate neural sys-
tems) (Griffiths 2007). These modules have been generally assumed to be local-
izable within the brain and to be neurally specific. In contrast, it has also been
proposed that there is no necessity for a cognitive module to be associated with a
localized fixed neural architecture (Coltheart 1999). An alternative hypothesis to
the functionally distinct, independent neurocognitive modules (e.g., in an extreme
view, language module owes nothing to other cognitive devices) is the (iv) descent-
with-modification view by which modules are shaped by evolutionary changes.
Thus, from common origin ancestral cognitive or neural modules/capacities, rela-
tively recent modules (such as language) may derive and draw on general cognitive
resources, consistent with features of neurodevelopmental disorders and develop-
mental language disorders (Marcus 2006).
Given the many invocations of the term modularity, also referred to as (v)
innatist-modularity (inborn modularity without modification), the modularity defi-
nition is considered so vague as to be essentially untestable (Twyman & Newcombe
2010).
3.2. Challenges to Cognitive Modularity: Domain-Specific and
Domain-General Processes
While cognitive modules clearly function in dynamic environments and have to
deal with change-induced novelty and uncertainty, the novelty of stimulus is prob-
lematic for the modular concept as it does not satisfy the modules criteria for do-
main specificity. In order to overcome this problem, a potential for (vi) transient
variations in domain-specificity (behavioral transitions from exploratory activity
to habit formation) have been proposed (Anselme 2012). Explanations for informa-
tion processing adaptation, however, remain controversial and the form in which
such adaptation may take is disputed.
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Brain mechanisms, if evolved through processes of descent with modifica-
tions are likely to be heterogeneous rather than limited to two specific kinds (mod-
ular and non-modular). As new structures evolve from older structures, adapta-
tions represent a mix of ancestral and derived features of which the older ones are
shared more widely across structures, while relatively recent ones (properties of
specialized brain regions) are more narrowly distributed in a hierarchically orga-
nized fashion (Caroll et al. 2005). The mix of these mechanisms are also likely to
be highly plastic, environmental factor dependent for development, and interactive
with other systems (Barrett 2012). A structure recaptured in the (vii) dual process
theory proposes two kinds of human cognitive domains: simple basic processes
shared with other animals and slower developing uniquely human processes, a
human cognitive architecture that is a mosaic of modular and domain-general pro-
cesses (Shettleworth 2012). Based on this model, variations in developmental out-
comes across individuals or environments may be standard for brain adaptations.
Adaptations for language exemplify this theory producing highly variable out-
comes in various languages (Evans & Levinson 2009).
Additionally, domains/modules are not persistent (inborn) and among the
modules, for example, language is viewed as a mechanism that moves infants from
an innate modular representation to integrated cognition in adulthood (Twyman
& Newcombe 2010). Or in contrasting opinions, infant brains start out highly
connected and only over developmental time do the networks become increas-
ingly specialized with domain-general and domain-specific processes (Steele et al.
2012). The organization of brain networks overlapping with functional domains
(executive and auditory/language processing) has been reported to also demon-
strate aging related changes, a reduction in functional segregation and intra- and
inter-module connectivity (Chen et al. 2011). Function related dynamic changes
have also been noted to occur such as an increase in connectivity between working
memory regions and language regions concomitant with processing load increase
(Makuuchi & Friderici 2013).
While specialized (modular) mechanisms appear innate, domain specific,
and/or isolated from other brain systems, the generalized mechanisms (non-
modular) are considered developmentally plastic instead of innate, domain-general
and interactive. Along these lines, the (viii) dual system view equates specialization
with highly local, narrow, and stereotyped (modular) processes, while the general-
purpose processes are defined as those outside modularity. Thus, features of devel-
opmental plasticity, interactivity, or the ability to respond to novel stimuli are taken
as evidence that a brain process or region is not evolutionarily specialized (Barrett
2012).
3.3. Brain Networks: Structurally Distributed and Functionally Diverse
Connectivity
The human brain has been subjected to extensive multiple scale studies from neu-
rons, circuits, anatomically defined areas to functional networks. Anatomically lo-
calized and functionally specific brain regions (developed through the maturation
of specialized groups of similar fate cells sparsely connected to groups of cells of
different fates) and their connecting networks, considered as information process-
ing systems, share some of the organizational principles of modular systems. As
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other complex systems, brain networks also demonstrate hierarchical structure, or
modularity on several topological scales (submodules and sub-submodules) that
ensure robustness, adaptivity, and ability for evolution of network function (Me-
unier et al. 2010). Brain organization studies based on data obtained in cat and
macaque brain connectivity using fiber tracking have identified four hierarchically
organized major sub-networks classified as visual, auditory, somatosensorimotor,
and frontolimbic. Human anatomical network analyses of cortical regions repro-
duced some of these functionally localized areas such as auditory/language, strate-
gic/executive, sensorimotor, visual, and mnemonic processing (Chen et al. 2008)
and interpreted the data as a modular — though with modules loosely defined as
groups of connected cortical regions — brain structural networks (Hagman et al.
2008).
In more complex cognitive functions, to establish the association of anatom-
ical brain structures with specific function ranging from synapses to entire brain
regions, remains a challenging task (Fotopoulou 2013). The integration of modu-
lar clusters in a larger-scale has also been problematic as modalities in the brain
that process different characteristics need to act in an isolated fashion for efficient
computations, yet need to be sufficiently connected to perform coherent functions.
In order to overcome the limitations of the modular cognitive model (with
modules variably defined as network areas based on connectivity features: high
intra- and sparse interconnectedness), several types of alternatives have been pro-
posed. The network view emphasizes that a complex system is shaped by the inter-
actions among its constituents driven by universal selection criteria, such as high
efficiency of information transfer at low physical connection cost (Sporns 2010).
The functional integration-convergence model further emphasizes the significance
of connectivity patterns among various interconnected, functionally diverse, and
structurally distributed components of the nervous system (Fotopoulou 2013). An-
other alternative is the adaptive combination model supported by results of a study
that challenge the existence of a geometric/reorientation module and hypothesizes
that information (geometric and featural in this case) is utilized to varying degrees
dependent on the certainty and variance that these two kinds of information rep-
resent (Ratliff & Newcombe 2008, Twyman & Newcombe 2010). Additionally, a
recent combination of high-temporal resolution fMRI and network analysis tools
have revealed both functional and topological fractal properties of brain networks,
described as a two-layer structure (strong ties in a sea of weak ties) that fulfill the
need for information flow within complex structures (Gallos et al. 2012).
3.4. High-Level Cognitive Functions Enlist a Global Neuronal Workspace
Adult human cognition shares simple basic processes with the cognition of other
animals while additionally includes unique, slower-developing, usually slower act-
ing, more explicit, and consciously accessible processes, among which the kind ver-
sus the degree of cognitive difference has not always been clearly defined. The
relatively low level cognitive or perceptual processes based on features such as
domain-specific, informationally encapsulated, fast, automatic, and anatomically
localized, can be characterized as physiologically modular. In contrast, higher-
level integrated, effortful, and conscious cognitive processes have been linked to
anatomically distributed neuronal workspace architecture that may have emerged
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by breaking modularity of the background modular system (Dehaene et al. 1998),
suggesting that modularity and/or non-modularity of brain network organization
may be related to the type of cognitive processing that it can support (Meunier et
al. 2010), and by this definition certain elements may be modular, while others are
not (Barrett 2012).
Consistent with this theory is the basic modular architecture of the visual
system (Magen & Cohen 2007) and evidence in favor of modular processing of ver-
bal and spatial information in short-term memory (Guerard & Tremblay 2008). A
contrasting non-modularity characterizes the central auditory function involving
higher order performance (Musiek et al. 2005), the task-dependent activation of
multiple/alternative pathways in prelexical and semantic processing, and the dy-
namically determined cortical network supporting language comprehension (Price
2010). Additionally, there is a continuum between strictly modular processing (in
perceptual tasks) and varying degrees of modular and shared processing (in ana-
lytical tasks) that depends on the nature of the task (Borowsky et al. 2007).
Effortful cognitive performance that depends on the formation of a global
neuronal workspace enlists — with increasing demand and faster performance —
a more global, less clustered, and less modular networks with more long-distance
synchronizations to allow the transient adoption of functional networks for less
economical but more efficient configuration (Kitzbichler et al. 2011).
3.5. Functional Segregation and Integration: Continuum and a Matter of
Degree
Neuropsychological theories that infer the functional role of certain brain areas on
the basis of the consequence of damage to these areas (localizationist and anti-
localizationist theories) served as the bases for two central principles of structure-
function relations: functional specialization/segregation (specialized neurons form
segregated regions responsible for discrete mental function) and functional integra-
tion/convergence (mental functions are based on connectivity patterns among var-
ious functionally diverse and structurally distributed components of the nervous
system) (Friston & Price 2011, Fotopoulou 2013).
The segregation model derives from the long tradition of concepts for special-
ized organs and specialized brain modules and the logic of information processing
systems that perform a series of formal operations (reviewed in Kanwisher 2010).
Based on the theory that the mind is modular in its core conception, organized in
computationally autonomous serially organized domains of function, brain dam-
age was anticipated to result in a selective, encapsulated impairment of a compo-
nent of cognitive processing without affecting other components. Earlier studies
based on these assumptions aimed to identify behavioral dissociations to suggest
new modular division in which cognitive information followed paths along serially
organized modules each serving a different core cognitive function. In structure-
function mapping studies (neuroimaging based mapping between neuronal activ-
ity and cognitive function), modularity of processing and processes was a key ref-
erence for establishing functional segregation as a principle of brain organization.
The modularity theory also contributed to characterization of distributed brain re-
sponses in terms of functional integration or coupling among different brain areas
(modular but coupled) (Friston & Price 2011).
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The contrary concepts of distributed neural and cognitive processing have an
equally rich tradition (Kanwisher 2010). It has been increasingly recognized that
correlations between mental tasks and surrogate brain signals in functional neu-
roimaging studies have provided only indirect evidence (inferences about cogni-
tion based on neural activation). The initial and relatively simple imaging and sta-
tistical analyses resulted in simplistic localizationist and modular arguments about
the role of certain brain areas in complex mental functions. From mapping of sen-
sory functions into functionally specialized areas in the human cortex (spatial seg-
regation) does not follow that similar kind of mapping would apply to complex
cognitive and emotional functions.
The use of more refined methods to investigate the neural basis of the mind in
vivo allowed insight into functions such as semantic processing and memory, and
beyond these, into emotion and empathy. The concept that the human mind can be
understood by examining exclusively cognitive functions has also undergone con-
siderable criticism with increasing support for the view that mental abilities are de-
fined also by emotions and motivations and are subject to intricate interactions with
interpersonal, social, and technological environments. As a result, there is a recent
change in emphasis from functional segregation to considerations of functional in-
tegration and to methods that allow the capture of dynamic large-scale operations
in the brain. The possibility to observe structural connectivity, such as non-tasks
specific large-scale distributed networks and (non-stimulus driven) self-organizing
endogenous brain activity, reveal a neurocognitive organization that surpasses the
classical modular and computational centered view of the mind (Fotopoulou 2013).
There are still debated questions as how specialized regions of the brain are, how
much of the mind is made up of specialized components, and importantly, whether
the functional specialization is all or none or it is a matter of degree (Kanwisher
2010).
4. The Organizing Principles of Language
4.1. A Distributed and Hierarchical Language-Serving Network Structure
The brain regions that serve the capacity for language, collectively provide the se-
mantic, syntactic, phonological, and pragmatic operations required for language
comprehension and production. Previously developed language models such as
the Wernicke-Lichtheim-Geschwind model that describe left-lateralized language
functions give only limited view and interpretation of language processing in the
brain. The language networks proved more extended than those defined (based
on the earliest brain imaging research) as the classical language regions/modules
(Broca and Wernicke areas) and include, as part of a prominent network-forming
region, the lateral surface of the left frontal, temporal and parietal cortices and
a number of other cortical, subcortical and cerebellar regions (reviewed in Fe-
dorenko 2014). The division of labor between Broca‘s region (frontal cortex) and
Wernicke‘s region (temporal cortex) does not correspond to language production
versus language comprehension. Contrary to earlier reported functional distinction
between language and other cognitive processes (Fedorenko et al. 2011), none of
the language-relevant regions and none of the language-specific neurophyscholog-
ical effects have proved language-specific as these are also triggered by other input
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(Koelsch et al. 2002). For language as for other cognitive functions, the function-
to-structure mapping as one-to-one correspondence is almost certainly incorrect
(Petersson et al. 2012).
An analysis of the network structure for associative-semantic processing that
also sub-serves many important cognitive functions, identified networks, sub-
networks, and hub-status nodes with local clustering and discerned four major
communities or sub-systems (Vanderberghe et al. 2012). In an attempt to iden-
tify cognitive elements involved in semantic circuitry and to capture the entire
network (as opposed to individual functional components localized by method-
ologically limited neuroimaging studies and linear modeling) a group indepen-
dent component analysis (ICA), providing both spatial and temporal information,
identified a more complicated language distribution pattern, an elaborate network
involving several additional spatially independent brain regions (eight task-related
group ICA maps) sub-serving semantic decision. The authors of this work recog-
nized the importance of information gained when analyzing cognitive functions in
terms of underlying network structures, demonstrated that the semantic network
comprises left, right, and bilateral sub-networks, concluded functional connectiv-
ity, and proposed a hierarchical cognitive model for semantic decision tasks, yet
summarized this complex structure as modular with such broad functional (mod-
ule) categories as verbal encoding and mental imagery and semantic decision mak-
ing as sub-modules (Kim et al. 2011). In spite of revoking modularity in this study,
the authors also propose each brain regions activation/function not as that of an
isolated module(s), but rather as part of a network.
In these reports as in many others, the use of the terms module and/or mod-
ular have many connotations but few, if any, defined characteristics or specific cri-
teria and critical attributes of modules (automatic, encapsulated, or neuronally spe-
cialized). Moreover, the terms modular and modules are often used as synonymous
with various functional unit(s), however, with diversely defined content, and in-
terchangeable with circuitry, networks, sub-networks and/or nodes, overlapping
with the non-modular, dynamic network system concept.
4.2. Interactive Language-Related Abilities: The Role of Developmental
Time
Interpretations of some the neurodevelopmental disorders have been viewed both
as evidence for modular preservation of language or evidence for non-modular
cognitive development (Brock 2007). Some of these disorders have been consid-
ered as conditions in which selective modules are impaired while others (language)
appear normal (reviewed in Szalontai & Csisza´r 2013). Williams syndrome with se-
lective cognitive deficits but relatively preserved language, had been initially pro-
posed as an example for modularity of language. Abundant subsequent evidence
on alterations in brain development, language features, and interactions among
cognitive capacities in Williams syndrome, however, point to contrary hypothe-
ses. Genetic (Vanderweyer et al. 2012), and extensive developmental (Karmiloff-
Smith 2007, 2012) studies revealed that in Williams syndrome, deficits profoundly
affect synaptic activity, neuronal density, brain size and morphology, and functional
connectivity. Among Williams-specific language features, spatial language deficits
mirror deficits in nonverbal spatial cognition (Brock 2007). There is dissociation
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between grammatical rules and the mental lexicon in the production of inflected
form for irregulars, as well as a correlation between performance on morphological
tasks and phonological short-term memory (Ple´h et al. 2003), and between seman-
tic organization and reading levels (Lee & Binder 2014). Furthermore, the common
basic auditory processing shared by prosody and music, is also affected (Don et
al. 1999). While patients do process music and prosody through shared mecha-
nisms, these are different from those in non-affected individuals (Martinez-Castilla
& Sotillo 2014). The language phenotype in Williams syndrome, therefore, is not
an indicator for a selectively spared (language) module, but the interactive result
of multiple altered neural and cognitive processes during development (D‘Souza
& Karmiloff-Smith 2011).
In specific language impairment (SLI), traditionally considered as a single im-
paired function within a normally functioning brain with intact cognition, affected
children proved to have lower performance IQ (Botting 2005), an overall increased
radiate white matter, altered intrahemispheric and corticocortical connections (Her-
bert et al. 2004), asymmetry in their language-association cortex (De Fosse et al.
2004), and abnormal development of brain structures that constitute the procedural
memory system (Ullman & Pierpont, 2005). This complex phenotype in SLI does
not support the involvement of a putative single language module. A develop-
mental model of SLI proposes a higher order of complexity: As language emerges
from multiple abilities (attention sharing, speech pattern detection, phonetic and
phonemic discriminations, speech processing speed), contribution from lower level
deficits in any or several of these abilities during development can contribute to the
phenotype (D‘Souza & Karmiloff-Smith 2011). Comparisons of adult and develop-
ing cognition including language revealed a strong role for developmental time in
both typical and atypical development as infant brains start out highly connected
and only during development do the networks become increasingly specialized.
Understanding the concurrent and longitudinal constraints can cast a broader light
on the role of development and relationships between domain-general (attention)
and domain-specific (vocabulary, letter knowledge, phonological skills) processes
(Steele et al. 2012).
4.3. Task-Dependent Recruitment of Perceptual and Cognitive Processes
Language used to be widely considered as different and distinct from other cog-
nitive functions with its own specific organizational principles. Subsequent views,
while considered some elements or principles specific to language (basic primi-
tives, features, syllables that allow to begin to distinguish different types of pat-
terned stimuli), recognized that some characteristics may become grammaticised
over time. Furthermore, it was also recognized that interactive constrains on lin-
guistic performance and structure arise from cognitive constrains on learning and
real-time processing (Christiansen & Chater 2008, Newport 2010).
These organizing principles, while characteristic of language, are not unique
to language and also include organizing principles for other functional domains
(motor behavior). The basic language organizing principles recognized as shared
with other cognitive domains include computation of mutual information, entropy,
conditional probability, contingency or predictiveness between elements and com-
puted over hierarchical rather than linear distance in a recursive fashion (Newport
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2011). Consequently, a unique combination of cognitive functions constrains lan-
guage and the localization of these cognitive functions arises not from the inherent
localization of cognitive modules but from the interactions of multiple cognitive
and perceptual processes involved in a particular function (Newport 2010).
The cortical network thought to be domain-specific for language process-
ing has been shown to also process musical information suggesting that this net-
work is less domain-specific than previously believed (Koelsch et al. 2002). While
considerable research supported the view that faces and words are subserved by
independent neural mechanisms located in the ventral visual cortex in opposite
hemispheres, a current study demonstrated a co-mingling of face and word recog-
nition mechanisms. This co-mingling is unexpected from a domain-specific per-
spective, but follows as a consequence of an interactive, learning-based account in
which neural processes for both faces and words are the results of an optimization
procedure with specific principles and constraints. A comparison of pseudoword
and face identification revealed that both stimulus types exploit common neural
resources within the ventral cortical network (sublexical orthographic represen-
tations within the left ventral cortex and continuity of reading with other visual
recognition skills) (Nestor et al. 2012). Thus cognitive functions appear to arise not
from localized cognitive modules (language or face perception) but from the inter-
action of multiple perceptual and cognitive processes that underlie a particular task
(Behrmann & Plaut 2013).
A meta-analysis of comparative functional anatomy data for speech compre-
hension and production in healthy adult brain including activation patterns for
prelexical speech perception, meaningful speech, semantic retrieval, sentence com-
prehension, and incomprehensible sentences, identified association with the use of
prior knowledge of semantic associations, world sequences, and articulation that
predict the content of the sentence. Speech production activated the same regions
as speech comprehension and additional areas for word retrieval, articulatory plan-
ning, the initiation and execution of speech, and suppression of unintended re-
sponses (Price 2010). The observation that prelexical and semantic processing of
spoken words extend into anterior, ventral, and posterior directions suggested that
the same speech input can follow multiple different pathways in which the location
of activation is determined by the task demands similar to alternative strategies and
dual routes, featuring both a direct and an indirect route (noted earlier for phono-
logical processing (Heim 2005)).
Collectively, results from these studies (without even addressing functional
connectivity of the activated regions), strongly promote the view that the cortical
networks supporting language comprehension are dynamically determined by the
task and context.
4.4. Domain-General Cognitive Control and Functionally Specialized
Language Regions: Division of Labor
Abundant evidence shows that the network-forming language system with some-
what varying functional definitions (the lateral surface of the left frontal, tem-
poral and parietal cortices and a number of other cortical, subcortical and cere-
ballar regions) (Fedorenko & Thompson-Schill 2014), interacts with several cog-
nitive systems including the visual system, social cognition supporting system,
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and, importantly, the working memory/cognitive control network/mechanisms
(Fedorenko 2014). Some of these cognitive mechanisms are also known to be shared
between language and other functions such as musical ability with highly sim-
ilar structural and expressive features (Perrachione at al. 2013). The cognitive
control network/multiple-demand system, also referred to as task-positive net-
work, or fronto-parietal attention network (including parts of the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex, parts of the insular cortex, regions along the precentral gyrus, pre-
supplementary and supplementary motor area, parts of the anterior cingulated,
and regions in and around the intraparietal sulcus), is domain-general and flexi-
ble according to task demands and is implicated in a broad range of goal-directed
behaviors. While its role in complex behaviors is not fully understood, the cog-
nitive control system has been implicated in attention, working memory, cognitive
control, structure building, timing/sequencing, attentional episodes, and conscious
awareness (Fedorenko 2014). The cognitive control network is spatially and func-
tionally distinct from the language system, however, it responds to linguistic input
(both to pseudowords or processing of natural sentences) as much as the language
system. While domain-general regions are engaged during language comprehen-
sion, dissociations from the language network also exist, indicating that the cog-
nitive control regions may not be essential for language comprehension. Yet these
interactions may still function in facilitating efficiency or speed of comprehension,
providing workspace and alternative routes, or support predictive processing (Fe-
dorenko 2014). The involvement of domain-general processes not only in language
comprehension, but also in language acquisition is supported by the impairment
of implicit sequence learning in SLI (Luka´cs & Keme´ny 2014).
5. Conclusion
The theory of modularity as a general principle with traditions in informatics has
been historically applied to aspects of human cognition. Modularity views have
been specifically influential in characterizing the organizing principles and struc-
tural and functional elements of language. Application of strict modularity, how-
ever, has been controversial as it precludes complex cognitive processes. With re-
cent advances in brain activation analysis and systems biology interpretation of
these results, the various and controversial definitions of what constitutes a module
or a modular organization have sparked profound theoretical debates. Criteria for
a cognitive modular system remain inconsistent and range from the definition that
emphasizes topological modularity (dense intra- and sparse inter-connectedness)
(Meunier et al. 2010), to a system with independently disruptable components
(Menzies 2012, Sternberg 2010), to a property of being made up of self-contained
and independently functioning parts (Shettleworth 2012), to the most basic use of
the term as a capacity with functionally individuated input and output conditions
(Menzies 2012).
Alternative models of modularity and alternatives to modular organization
have been suggested in order to resolve some of these controversies and address
the limitations inherent in modular system organization. Examples of these mod-
els include the functional and topological two-layer structure for information flow
integrating modular clusters in a large scale (Gallos et al. 2012), introduction of
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the feature of transient variations in module domain-specificity (Anselme 2012),
the modular-but-coupled theory (Friston & Price 2011), and the descent-with-
modification modularity involving evolutionary changes (Marcus 2006).
Specialized modular mechanisms are considered innate, domain specific and
isolated, in contrast, non-modular mechanisms are generalized, developmentally
plastic, domain-general, and interactive, overall, more suitable to capture the work-
ing principles of the cognitive system. Theories that embrace generalized mech-
anisms take into consideration the effect of the variance of types of information
(Ratliff and Newcombe 2008, Twyman & Newcombe 2010), the dynamic interac-
tion of multiple neural and cognitive processes and the role of developmental time
(D‘Souza & Karmiloff-Smith 2011, Karmiloff-Smith 2012), the significance of con-
nectivity patterns among functionally diverse and structurally distributed compo-
nents of the central nervous system (Fotopoulou 2013), and equate specialization
with local, narrow, and stereotyped functions, and general processes as those out-
side modularity (Barrett 2012) with a view of the cognitive architecture as a mosaic
of modular and domain-general processes (Shettleworth 2012).
The large-scale operations in the brain have been interpreted with a recent
emphasis on dynamic functional integration rather than segregation. Structural
connectivity data, including distributed networks and endogenous brain activity,
have revealed a neurocognitive organization that surpasses the classical modu-
lar and/or computational centered view (Fotopoulou 2013) and suggest a brain
network organization that is determined by the type of actual cognitive process-
ing (Meunier et al. 2010). A task-dependent continuum has been also noted be-
tween modular processing and varying degrees of modular and shared process-
ing (Borowsky et al. 2007), and functional specialization has been formulated as a
matter of degree (Kanwisher 2010). Higher-level and effortful cognitive processes
proved to be linked to an anatomically distributed neuronal workspace architec-
ture (Dehaene et al. 1998) that and enlist with increasing demand, a global network
configuration with long-distance synchronizations and transient adoption of func-
tional networks (Kitzbichler et al. 2011).
Theories of language organizing principles are profoundly shaped by the
facts that none of the traditionally defined language-relevant regions and none
of the neurophyschological effects proved language-specific, there is no one-to-
one correspondence for cognitive function and structure (Petersson et al. 2012),
the principles of language organization are not unique but shared with other cog-
nitive domains (Newport 2011), and are the developmental time-dependent re-
sult of interactions of neural and cognitive processes (Karmiloff-Smith 2012), the
language-serving network is more elaborate than previously anticipated and in-
volves connectivity of several newly recognized and spatially independent brain
regions (Kim et al. 2011), language associated cognitive functions arise from the
interaction of multiple perceptual and cognitive mechanisms, cortical networks
while not domain-specific for language (Koelsch et al. 2002) reflect a learning-based
mechanism in which neural processes are the results of an optimization procedure
(Behrmann & Plaut 2013), with a multiple pathways activation pattern determined
by the task demands (Price 2010).
Together with the activation of the language network, the domain-general
multiple-demand system also engages (Fedorenko 2014), and while not essential,
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it may facilitate efficiency or speed by providing workspace and alternative pro-
cessing routes. As cognitive function of any region depends on the areas that it
interacts with (Price 2010), the functional association of language regions can only
be revealed in the context of their interactions with other brain regions and with the
understanding of the task-dependent modulation of these regional interactions.
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